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1. Introduction
In “Compassion, Authority and Baby Talk: Prosody and Objectivity,” Groarke and Kišiček make
a case for incorporating prosody into analyses and assessments of argument. I agree that prosody
is argumentatively relevant and that it ought to be assessed for its rationality. But I argue that
because not all prosody is the strategy of making an argument, we ought to use methods of
analysis and evaluation that fit the actual message design in order to explain strategic uses of
prosody.
2. Prosody is argumentatively relevant
The authors hold that prosody is “argumentatively relevant” or, in other words, “information that
needs to be considered when seriously assessing the acceptability of a standpoint” (p. 2).
Because the roles prosody plays in actual arguing “are easily lost and overlooked when audible
voices are ‘translated’ into written words and language” (p. 4), we ought to analyze message
designs of actual communication; and Groarke and Kišiček do just that. Presumably social actors
who argue routinely bring to bear tacit and explicit knowledge about how to address ordinary
communicative challenges, such as getting auditors’ attention or inducing them to feel a
particular emotion, and prosody is one resource for addressing the challenges.
Groarke and Kišiček assert that they are using the term “argument” as “traditionally
conceived: as collections of premises and conclusions” (p. 4). I will use the term in that sense as
well—as what O’Keefe (1982) has described as argument1. Following O’Keefe (1982), I will
also use the term “argument1-making”; arguments1 are conveyed in acts of argument1-making. In
a paradigm case of argument1-making, both the claim and overtly expressed reason must be
linguistically explicable (we must be able to say what the claim and reason are). The overtly
expressed reason must be explicit but need not be verbal and may be prosodic.
3. Not all prosody is argument
Although prosody is argumentatively relevant, I submit that not all uses of prosody are best
characterized as “prosodic argument” (e.g., pp. 5, 8). It is possible and desirable to distinguish
the strategy of argument1-making from other kinds of communication strategies. Groarke and
Kišiček suggest that grounds exist for distinguishing prosody-as-argument1 from prosody-as-
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strategy when they contrast their interest “in the ways that prosody can be a core element of
arguments traditionally conceived” with the role prosody may play “in speech delivery” (p. 4).
I submit that prosody is best analyzed as argument1-making when it serves a
demonstration function. The authors illustrate that role by noting that prosody can serve as
evidence for a claim to be able to speak in a Russian accent. The authors spend the least amount
of time on the demonstration function, probably because it is the clearest, most straightforward
way that prosody fits the analytical method of reconstruction in terms of premises and
conclusions.
But in other instances prosody is better analyzed and assessed as a strategy designed to
work differently from the strategy of argument1-making. Groarke and Kišiček suggest the
difference when they observe, “We hear someone on a radio and perceive him/her as deceptive,
irritating, appealing etc. without being aware of the reasons why we feel this way. Often the
reason is not what someone says but how they say it” (p. 11)—i.e., not reasons someone gives
but strategies designed to cue inferences. In contrast to the inferring from premises to
conclusions made possible by argument1-making, inferences cued by prosody “often rely on
stereotypes and frequently work on a subconscious level” (p. 11). In those cases prosody is not
designed to “manifest rationality” (Johnson 2000) in the same way that argument1-making is.
Some social scientific researchers describe the difference in terms of a spectrum of cognitive
processing (the Elaboration Likelihood Model). At one end is peripheral processing, which is
quick, involves less cognitive effort, and is often described as using “shortcuts” or “heuristics.”
At the other end is central processing, which is slower and involves the cognitive effort of
thinking “about issue-relevant arguments contained in persuasive messages” (Eagly and Chaiken
1993, p. 306). Of course argument1-making can be processed centrally as listeners scrutinize
arguments1. Argument1-making can also be processed peripherally. For example, in a case where
a speaker advocates for a proposal, listeners may assume “that the more arguments, the more
carefully researched the proposal must be” (Petty and Cacioppo 1984, p. 78), and warrant their
attitude by that simple rule rather than thinking carefully about the merits of the arguments 1.
Moreover, strategies processed peripherally may be rational (O’Keefe 1995). There is nothing
inherently irrational about strategies processed subconsciously or using heuristics.
4. Assessing argumentatively relevant prosodic strategies that are not arguments1
I agree with Groarke and Kišiček that critics ought to assess the rationality of strategies such as
prosody, but assessing the rationality of subconscious inferences from cues is different from
assessing the rationality of arguments1, or the relationships among premises and conclusions.
Consider a case where a speaker advocates a policy change. The speaker may make special
efforts to sound confident, so she designs prosody to cue listeners to infer that she feels
confident. Prosody is a fallible sign of confidence, and listeners may take into account any
number of factors (e.g., steady hands, posture) to decide whether the inference that the speaker
feels confident is warranted. But the strategies a speaker deploys to cue inferences about her
level of confidence are different from the strategy of argument1-making she deploys to show that
her conclusions about, say, the practicality and justice of the policy are rationally warranted.
Prosody is argumentatively relevant. Listeners may discount the speaker’s arguments 1 because
she does not sound confident, even in cases where the arguments1 merit scrutiny. Or listeners
may not make the effort to scrutinize arguments1 just because they are delivered in confident
tones. In both cases prosody licenses inferences that may be assessed for rationality
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independently of the rationality of the inferential structure of arguments 1 that she presents to
advocate for the policy.
Scott Jacobs’ work shows a way to assess prosodic strategies that are not demonstrations.
For example, we can ask if strategies put listeners “in a position to decide if claims should be
reasonably accepted or rejected” (Jacobs 2000, p. 274). Strategies may be designed “to
encourage mutual, voluntary, free, comprehensive, open, fair, impartial, considered, reasoned,
informed, reflective, and involved engagement” (Jacobs 2000, p. 274)—a significant role given
that “the conditions for argumentation are always in some ways limiting” (Jacobs 2006, p. 430)
and social actors must try to make do.
Consider the Ram truck advertisement featuring Paul Harvey’s voice that aired during the
Super Bowl and was “directed at American farmers” (p. 6) and probably other segments of the
heavy-duty truck market such as residential and commercial construction workers since the line
at the end of the ad reads, “To the farmer in all of us.” Groarke and Kišiček use the ad to
illustrate that prosody can be used as a flag to get attention (p. 8) and as an implicit conclusion
reconstructed as: “What Harvey speaks about (farming) should be revered” (p. 7). But I submit
that reconstructing the ad as if it were deploying the strategy of argument1-making—by rewriting
it in terms of premises and conclusions—does not explain how its actual design is
argumentatively relevant. The ad does not make the kinds of arguments1 that someone buying a
work truck considers, such as arguments1 about towing capabilities, suspension, durability, and
fuel economy. Chrysler could have chosen to use argument1-making strategies. Some truck ads
show images of trucks hauling heavy loads off-road or at a construction site, and talk about the
power and fuel economy of engines. But in the Super Bowl ad Chrysler mostly shows images of
farmers, their families, and farmed landscapes; and the images and voiceover invoke broad
values such as hard work, love of family, care for animals, civic engagement, religion. The main
design strategy is not argument1-making (showing or displaying reasons for buying a Ram
truck). The prosody, images, and other message features are designed to cue inferences that
Chrysler understands and admires farmers and shares broad values that farmers and other heavyduty truck owners may hold.
It is an open question whether the prosody and other strategies ought to be assessed as
rationally acceptable, that is, whether they put viewers in a position to reasonably decide whether
to buy a Ram truck. For the sake of illustration, I suggest that they are rationally acceptable
because they create good reasons (i.e., license a reasonable presumption) to consider buying a
Ram truck. Chrysler counts on viewers to presume that, because the maker of Ram trucks
understand them and their values, Ram trucks deserve some consideration from truck buyers.
The presumption that a speaker who understands our situation and shares our values deserves
some of our attention seems reasonable. Prudent people do not attend to every effort to attract
their attention, so message sources routinely make special efforts to show their messages deserve
attention. The Ram truck ad cues inferences that serve as rational grounds for viewers to seek
further information about Ram trucks, perhaps by paying attention to Ram truck ads that do
make arguments1, searching for online videos that demonstrate trucks’ towing capabilities,
weighing the performances and costs of a Hemi engine versus an EcoBoost engine, and more.
5. Conclusion
A full analysis and assessment of the ad would need to say much more. Here I only intend to
sketch an analysis and assessment that maintains fidelity to the authors’ goals of analyzing
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prosody as an argumentatively relevant strategy and assessing its rationality. I agree that prosody
may be usefully analyzed as argument1 when it is deployed in the role of demonstration. But
when it is not an argument1, then we ought to analyze it as a strategy that may or may not
enhance conditions for scrutinizing arguments or achieving warranted assent.
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